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MULFORD Q. SIBLEY
It is important to see how a localized conflict implicates the international com-
munity as a whole and reflects a failure of their collective responsibilities.
These considerations bear on a moral evaluation of the Vietnam conflict.
Certain participants are obviously identifiable, but it would be erroneous to pass
an ethical judgment solely on their conduct. From the conclusion of the war
with the French to the present there has been a failure of all the nations of the
world to meet their responsibilities in Southeast Asia. A central truth which has
emerged from intervention by the United States is the folly of any attempt by
a single state, no matter how powerful, to solve problems which are international
in their most profound dimensions. Hence ethics, too, must adopt a world per-
spective.
CORNELIUS F. MURPHY, JR.
II. THE MORALITY OF WAR:
THE CASE OF VIETNAM
There has been considerable recent discussion of the morality of war in
general.1 Unfortunately, however, moral issues have not been central in the
widespread debate about the war in Vietnam.
One can plausibly and forcefully argue that war itself is intrinsically evil
and utterly forbidden. This so-called pacifist view would not necessarily repudiate
all use of physical force but only that organized use of force, with its accom-
panying complex of habits, which we have customarily called "war." From
this perspective, moral judgment on the Vietnamese war is relatively simple: all
war is forbidden; the conflict in Vietnam is a war; therefore the Vietnamese
war is forbidden.
While the present writer would personally subscribe to the pacifist position,
it is still the outlook of only a tiny minority. Most men today and for many hun-
dreds of years have in principle subscribed to some kind of "just war" theory.
Whatever its specifics, such a view holds that, while the burden of proof must
always be upon those who would resort to war, there are, nevertheless, circum-
stances under which war can be "just" or "moral." In its classical expression,
this position has roots in antiquity but was developed and rounded out in the
writings of such men as St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, Hugo Grotius, and
Francisco Suarez. Modern students of the doctrine like Joseph C. McKenna
have sought to redefine and defend it.2 From the viewpoint of the "just war"
theory, the morality or justice of the Vietnamese war can be determined only by
I See, for example, WILLIAM I. MILLER, NONVIOLENCE: A CHRISTIAN INTERPRETATION
(1964); WILLIAM J. NAGLE, ed., MORALITY AND MODERN WARFARE (1960); and PAUL
RAMSEY, WAR AND THE CHRISTIAN CONSCIENCE (1961).
2 Joseph C. McKenna, S.J., Ethics and War: A Catholic View, 54 AMERICAN POLITICAL
SCIENCE REvIEW 647 (1960).
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applying the abstract standards for a just war to the peculiar context and details
of the Vietnamese conflict itself.
In what follows, we seek to make this application, using as the criteria
E. I. Watkin's convenient summary of standards for a just war:
1. the cause must be just;
2. the war must be made by a lawful authority - that is, by the legitimate
government of a sovereign state;
3. the intention of the government which declares war must be just;
4. the war must be the only means of attaining justice;
5. right means only may be employed in the conduct of the war, and immoral
means render the war unjustifiable;
6. there must be a reasonable hope of victory; and
7. the good to be probably attained by victory must outweigh probable
evil effects of the war.3
According to the developed just-war tradition, all seven of these conditions
must be met before we can justify a war.
We shall argue that by these criteria the war in Vietnam is clearly immoral
and that the citizen is under no obligation whatsoever to support it. Indeed,
he has a moral duty to oppose it by every ethically legitimate means which gives
promise of being fruitful.
While this discussion will examine the morality of the war primarily in terms
of the American government's statements and actions, we shall also maintain
that the war as waged by the National Liberation Front and the Hanoi govern-
ment is likewise immoral.
1. The Cause Must Be Just. - The history of mankind is filled with just
wars, if we judge only by this criterion; for in the statement of avowed aims,
most nations state objectives which have a ring of plausibility about them. And
most ruling classes which go to war undoubtedly believe what they say. When
Timur the Mongol, whose armies were responsible for killing millions of people,
stated that he was really a man of peace who went to war solely for a just cause,
we need not doubt his sincerity. "I am not a man of blood," he maintained, "and
God is my witness that in all my wars I have never been the aggressor, and that
my enemies have always been the authors of their own calamity." 4
So, too, the American case for military intervention in Vietnam appeals to
ideals which we can approve, even though we may be highly doubtful about the
alleged factual context for the statement of those ideals. President Johnson
summarized American purposes very early after the beginning of massive military
escalation in Vietnam: 1) We must fight, he said, so that "every country can
shape its own destiny"; 2) aggression from the North must be checked; 3) "The
rulers in Hanoi are urged on by Peking ... The contest in Vietnam is part of
a wider pattern of aggressive purposes"; 4) the United States has made promises
3E. I. Watkin, Unjustifiable War, in MoRALs AND Msssmu: CATHOLiC ESSAYS ON
THE PRoBLEM OF WAR ToDAY (C. S. Thompson ed., 1961).
4As quoted in HANS MOROENTHAU, PoIrIcs AMONo NATIONS 259, n.1 (1961).
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,which it must keep; and 5) "we are also there to strengthen world order," which
involves waging war to make the country's promises credible to others. 5
While we need not doubt that American statesmen believe that these are
the objectives of the war, the facts of the situation and the overall political con-
text would seem to suggest strongly that the stated purposes have little connec-
tion with empirical reality. Let us comment on each point:
1) The government of South Vietnam has been largely the creature of
Washington since its beginning in 1954. In fact, without American financial
and military support, the Saigon government could not have survived. 6 Local
government councils were abolished under Diem, the puppet of the United
States, and since Diem's assassination such elections as have been held have
excluded "neutralist" and "communist" candidacies. Elections have not been
"free." 7 Under these circumstances, the critic. may well be pardoned if he
doubts that the United States is fighting so that every country can "shape its
own destiny."
2) Almost all modern nations allege "aggression" as a pretext for war.
But has "aggression" occurred in Vietnam? The answer must be No. Legally,
Vietnam is a single nation (if we accept the Geneva agreements of 1954), so
that any factional struggles within it constitute civil conflict. The only foreign
nations which have troops in Vietnam are the Americans and their allies.8 To
say that China is an aggressor in Vietnam is to stretch an already abused term
beyond all recognition.
3) While there can be no doubt of Chinese technical and economic assis-
tance to North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front, even this came
relatively late and only after the United States had begun to escalate its own
military efforts. The age-long tensions between China and Vietnam, moreover,
are well known to all scholars of Southeast Asian affairs. To suggest that Hanoi
5 Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks at Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland, April
7, 1965. New York Times, April 8, 1965, p. 16.
6 JEAN LACOUTURE, VIETNAM: BETWEEN Two TeucEs 25 (1966), estimates that
at the time of the formation of the National Liberation Front, the United States was
covering 70% of the budgetary deficit of the South Vietnamese government and also "all
its military and police expenses." Since that time, dependence of the South Vietnamese
authorities on the United States has certainly not decreased. Some estimate that if the
United States were to withdraw its military and financial support, the Saigon regime would
collapse within two weeks.
7 Dr. David Wurfel, a political scientist and chairman of the Committee on Asian
Studies of the Department of Political Science, University of Missouri, says, after observing
the Sept. 7, 1967, elections on the spot: "1. The exclusion of the candidacies of General
Duong van Minh and Dr. Au Truong Thanh denied the people of South Vietnam true
freedom of choice and was achieved largely by illegal means .... 2. The relative freedom
of the campaign was badly marred by the closing of three newspapers and the continuation
of censorship .... 3. Fraud on election day was extensive, perhaps producing 300-500,000
votes and inflating the total number of voters by the same number. . . .4. Rigging of the
senate race was . . . blatant .... This election ends the great hope maintained since 1963
that free elections could be held .. " Dr. David Wurfel Reports on Vietnam: Preliminary
Reports of Vietnam Election Observer for Methodist Peace Division, SANE, Friends Com-
mittee on National Legislation, and Unitarian Universalist Association, 21 Sept. 1967
(mimeographed).
8 Quincy Wright, the well-known authority on international law, agrees that "aggres-
sion" in the usual sense was not involved in Vietnam. See his statement in WORLDVIEW,
Feb., 1965.
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and the National Liberation Front are simply puppets of China is without
foundation.
4) The astonishing fact is that the United States has made no "promises"
to wage a war, although Presidents have promised economic assistance under
certain circumstances. The SEATO treaty does not constitute a promise to inter-
vene in civil wars. 9 Moreover, what is the status of a "promise" made to a gov-
ernment which has in effect been an annex of the United States government
itself? Promises were never made to the Vietnamese people, for who represents
them?
5) No one, of course, would quarrel about the abstract goal of "world
order." But who is responsible for "world order"? In the modem world, it is
the United Nations, which was not consulted before the American military effort
was escalated. To say, moreover, that without an American war effort, others
would cease to believe in American promises strains our credulity- particularly
in view of the fact that most world opinion is against American military involve-
ment.
We must conclude, then, that the factual basis for many of the proclaimed
objectives is either absent entirely or is highly doubtful. Thus, if aggression has
in fact been committed, it may be held to be a legitimate cause for war. But
aggression in the usual sense has not occurred. And so with the other objectives.
The act of war is so grave a choice that the burden of proof must always be
on those who claim just cause; and the proponents of war have not submitted
this proof.
What, then, shall we say of the causes of the National Liberation Front
and the Hanoi government?
On December 20, 1960, the National Liberation Front issued its program
and it has been reiterated since then. In brief summary, the ten points are
1) overthrow of the "colonial regime of the American imperialists"; 2) institu-
tion of a "liberal" and "democratic" regime; 3) improvement of the living con-
ditions of the people; 4) fundamental agrarian reform; 5) development of a
national and democratic culture and education; 6) creation of a "national army"
and abolition of all foreign military bases; 7) equality between the various
minorities and the two sexes; 8) a foreign policy of peace and neutrality, includ-
ing rejection of all military blocs; 9) peaceful reunification of the country; and
10) struggle against "aggressive war" and for "peace, democracy and social
progress."10
North Vietnamese war aims were stated in a policy declaration of Premier
Pham Van Dong: 1) recognition of the basic national rights of the Vietnamese
people - peace, independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity, the
United States withdrawing all troops and military bases; 2) pending peaceful
reunification, military provisions of the Geneva agreements of 1954 must be
strictly respected, the two zones refraining from joining any military alliance
with other countries; 3) people of South Vietnam must settle their own affairs
9And it requires consultation among the partners, which was absent.
IOThe manifesto is reprinted in English translation in MARcus G. RASKIN and B. B.
FALL, THE VIETNAM READER 216-21 (1965).
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in accordance with the program of the NLF, without foreign interference; and
4) peaceful reunification is to be arranged by the Vietnamese people themselves,
in the absence of foreign intervention.1 1
Now if one examines these declarations closely, there is very little, in words,
with which an exponent of natural law conceptions of justice could quarrel.
The peasantry, notoriously, have been exploited, and since the middle of the
nineteenth century various foreign powers have dominated Vietnamese affairs.
1 2
In considerable measure, both the NLF and the Hanoi statements are nationalist
in tone- and understandably so. American intervention is, moreover, a species
of imperialism, however one defines that frequently vague expression. The NLF
and North Vietnamese cause would, then, appear to be just; and certainly it
is responding much more to the actual factual situation than does the American
statement of objectives.
Where one can raise questions is in the definition of terms. What does one
mean by "democratic" and how would the "Vietnamese people themselves"
act to unify the nation? If we use the experience of North Vietnam as a basis,
it may be doubted whether "democratic" implies absence of autocracy; for surely
the North Vietnamese regime has many autocratic tendencies. Despite their
appeal for freedom, moreover, one must certainly question whether the declara-
tions, read in the light of the forces behind them, actually mean freedom of
expression for everyone. The "Vietnamese people themselves" must probably
be translated "the most highly organized" segment of the people, namely an
alliance between the NLF and the Hanoi government.
The conclusion must be, probably, that NLF-Hanoi warfare is being waged
for a relatively just cause but within a context which makes many of the words
mean something quite different from what ordinary language would connote.
We may sum up the issue of just cause in brief terms:
1. Given the context and factual basis of the American cause, the war is
unjust.
2. Within the context and factual basis of the NLF-Hanoi cause, the war
would seem to have considerable justification, even though cloudy terminology
and demagogic appeals are undoubtedly present.
2. The War Must Be Made By a Lawful Authority, Legitimate Government.
-This condition for the justice of a war is indeed a conundrum. Just what is
a legitimate government? St. Augustine wrestled with the problem, it will be
remembered, finding it difficult at times to distinguish between the rulers of an
alleged civil polity and the governors of a robber band. The issue remains today.
But sometimes legitimacy is identified with recognition by other allegedly legiti-
mate governments. It is also associated with a certain degree of consent - or
habitual obedience - on the part of those governed. By these standards, the
United States gives the appearance of being legitimate, as does the Hanoi regime.
The case of South Vietnam is perhaps more doubtful on the score of consent,
11 The entire declaration is reprinted in the New York Times, April 14, 1965, p. 13.
'
2 For a recent rather detailed political history, see JosEPH BUTTINGER, VIETNAM: A
DRAGoN EMBATTLED, 2 vols. (1967).
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while the National Liberation Front ranks high in this respect. But the National
Liberation Front is not recognized by the international community as a legiti-
mate government
When one turns-to the question of whether the supposedly legitimate Ameri-
can government is acting in accordance with the law, one must have grave doubts.
Lawful authority must be defined in terms of the constitutional rules according
to which the governor should act. Now the Constitution of the United States
provides that war shall be declared by Congress and not by the President. In
drawing up this provision, the Founding Fathers were trying to guard against
the practice, represented by Great Britain, of allowing the executive to carry a
nation into armed conflict. In the Constitution, they carefully provided that,
while the President could repel invasion without asking for a declaration of war,
other acts of war required a declaration by Congress.
There has never been a declaration of war by Congress in the Vietnamese
conflict, and the report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (1967)
rightly suggests that presidential waging of war under these circumstances is an
act of "usurpation." Surely acts which represent usurpation can hardly be called
those of a lawful authority, but instead are analogous to "private" or unofficial
acts.1 3 And a private command to wage war is, according to the "just war"
doctrine, an act of injustice. To be sure, it is said that Congress authorized the
President to act through the passage of the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.
But the framers of that resolution, according to Senator Fulbright, never had
in mind that it would be used to justify a land war. Although the 1967 report
of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations admits that the resolution was
vague, still its very vagueness made it incumbent on those who began to wage
the war to seek specific authorization. This they never did. The Senate Com-
mittee argues persuasively that if the war powers of Congress are to mean any-
thing, they must be exercised through resolutions and declarations which are
13 The conclusions of the Foreign Relations Committee report are startling in their
implications. Says the committee (New York Times, Nov. 22, 1967, p. 12):
Claims to unlimited executive authority over the use of armed force are
made on grounds of both legitimacy and necessity. The committee finds both
sets of contentions unsound.
The argument for legitimacy is based on a misreading of both the Consti-
tution and the experience of American history. A careful study of the Consti-
tution and of the intent of the framers as set forth in the extensive documentation
which they bequeathed to us leaves not the slightest doubt that, except for
repelling sudden attacks on the United States, the founders of our country
intended decisions to initiate either general or limited hostilities against foreign
countries to be made by the Congress, not by the executive.
Only in the present century have Presidents used the armed forces of the
United States against foreign governments entirely on their own authority, and
only since 1950 have Presidents regarded themselves as having authority to
commit the armed forces to full-scale and sustained warfare.
The committee goes on to say that this shift from the intentions of the founders and
from early practice "is so great as to transfer authority from one branch of the Govern-
ment to the other." This negates "the intent of the Constitution" and threatens "democracy
and constitutional Government."
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specific in nature and not so general as to be virtually meaningless. If it be argued
that Congress provided money which the President has used for the war, ,the
answer is that appropriations powers and the war powers are clearly separated
in the Constitution and that one cannot, under the guise of appropriations, issue
declarations of war.
In sum, while the "government' of the United States is "legitimate" by the
standard of diplomatic recognition and a kind of general consent on the part
of the people, the President of that government illegally exercised the war power
in Vietnam. Hence he was not really acting as a public official but rather as a
private authority who happened to be fortunate enough to obtain money for
private purposes from Congress. If respect for the fundamental principles of
constitutional law be a criterion of "morality," then the Vietnamese war can-
not be sustained.
This cloudy title to "lawful authority" is made even more cloudy when we
recall, as a noted writer on international law points out,1 4 that at a very mini-
mum, American actions in Vietnam have violated Article 37 of the UN Charter,
which prescribes procedures that constituent governments must fulfill before
they can take military action. The United States did not, for example, raise the
question of alleged "aggression" before the Security Council, yet it was both
legally and morally obliged to do so. We must, therefore, consider the President's
actions as unlawful from the viewpoint of American constitutional law and also
illegal from the standpoint of the UN Charter.
3. The Intention of the Government Must be just. - Intention appears to
some degree to be akin to motive. Not only must the avowed cause be just but that
which moves a government to pursue the cause must also be morally acceptable.
Thus, aggression must not be opposed with the primary intention, for example,
of keeping in power a ruling clique which might be deposed if aggression were
to succeed.
Now intention in this sense of the term is notoriously hard to ascertain, just
as it is extremely difficult to discover whether the defendant in a murder trial
killed another man with malice aforethought. One can get at the intent, if at all,
not merely by reading words but by seeing those words in the context of a complex
of actions. One may then infer a certain intent, Which may or may not agree
with professed intent.
The difficulty may be illustrated in the case of the war in Vietnam by re-
calling the many statements expressing an intent on the part of Americans to
14 See Arthur Larson, Power and Law in World Affairs, THE PROGRESSIVE, Nov., 1966,
at 14. Larson is Director of the Rule of Law Research Center, Duke University.
Larson's contention that American action violated Article 37 of the UN charter is
supported by Quincy Wright, another eminent authority. In fact, Wright goes even
further: ". . . The United States should not have intervened with armed force or other-
wise unless there were very strong reasons for doing so. The only such reasons recognized
by the UN Charter are (1) authorization by the United Nations, or (2) collective self-
defense, if an outside state is supporting one side in the civil strife by armed force. . . . In
neither Viet-Nam nor Santo Domingo has the United States been authorized to intervene
by the United Nations." WORLDVIEW, Feb., 1965, reprinted in MARCUs G. RASKIN and
BERNARD B. FALL, THE VIET-NAM READER 7-12 (1965).
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withdraw militarily just as soon as aggression is checked or the Vietnamese people
have begun to govern themselves. 15 Taken at face value, these statements seem
to have the quality of justice. On the other hand, it may be argued that this
is an avowed intent only. The enormously expensive installations at Cam
Ranh Bay, for example, seem to betoken an intent to remain in Vietnam
over a very long period of time, as' do the actions of the United States in
Thailand. All things considered, it would seem that the intent of the United
States, morally speaking, is a very cloudy one at best. It is at least reasonably
probable that this country intends to remain in Southeast Asia over a con-
siderable number of years and to dominate nearby nations. After all, American
troops have been in Europe for more than twenty years and in Korea for almost
as long. -If the United States does intend to occupy Vietnam for a generation or
more, then the intent is unjust, for it implies a species of imperialism under the
guise of protection against tyranny and aggression. The support by the United
States of the present Thailand regime, not one of the least tyrannical in the
world, would seem to help support the contention of those who say that the
primary intent of the President is to establish permanent footholds for the
enhancement of American power. Something like what Senator Fulbright has
called the "arrogance of power" is surely involved. In a day when dark peoples
are revolting against white imperialism of all kinds, such an intent, at a minimum,
violates the moral consciousness of most of mankind; and a decent respect for
the opinions of mankind would seem to require that the moralist give full recog-
nition both to the insufferability of apparent American intentions and to the
widespread hostile reaction to those intentions.
As for the intentions of Hanoi and the NLF, one may have to differentiate
between the two. It is possible that the intent of the former is to dominate
all of Vietnam without giving the inhabitants much of a free choice. In so doing,
Hanoi's intent could conceivably clash with that of the NLF, which may be a
spokesman for South Vietnamese sentiment, as over against the views of the
northerners (and clashes between North and South are by no means new in Viet-
narnese history). If the real intentions of Hanoi and NLF are primarily along
these lines, one can surely condemn them, particularly in the light of Hanoi's not
too nice respect for human life as it consolidated its power in the North. One
may defend the intent of the NLF, in part, insofar as it may be identified as one
of encouraging South Vietnamese morale and acting as a spokesman for legitimate
claims to autonomy. If there is indeed a tension between the intentions of the
North and the NLF, it is not possible wholly to condemn or support either.
4. War Must Be the Only Possible Means of Securing justice. - Is war the
15 Thus in the White Paper of Feb., 1965 (State Department Publication 7839), the
government said: "The United States seeks no territory, no military bases, no favored
position.... If peace can be restored in South Viet-Nam, the United States will be ready
at once to reduce its military involvement." And several statements of the President since
then have reiterated Secretary McNamara's promise of March 26, 1964 (Address to National
Security Industrial Association, Washington, D.C.): "When the day comes that we can
safely withdraw, we expect to leave an independent and stable South Viet-Nam... "
50 DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 570 (1964).
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only possible means of securing justice? Much depends, of course, on what one
means by justice in the context of Vietnamese events. Here we shall use the term
to embrace such goals as a reasonable national autonomy, basic economic reform,
rule by law, and an elimination of the last vestiges of imperialist control.
In terms of these ends, the war, on the part of all combatants, must be seen as
utter disaster. National autonomy is likely to be seriously compromised who-
ever "wins" the war. Already it is notorious that Vietnam has become the
playing field for international power politics, the victims being the Vietnamese
themselves. National aspirations become increasingly incidental, as the southern
power structure is linked more and more to the United States and the northern
to the Soviet Union and China. A reasonable national autonomy can only suffer
under these conditions; and the longer the war continues, the greater is this a
probability.
Basic economic reform, including transformation of land tenure, while much
talked of, is likely to be casualty of the war.16 Although some important changes
in the direction of justice took place in North Vietnam after the expulsion of
the French, in South Vietnam there has been only tinkering on the part of the
oligarchy supported by the United States. And the longer the war continues,
the greater the destruction; the only justice conceivable would be a sharing of
poverty. The utter devastation of war - and particularly of this war - makes
a mockery of fundamental economic reform. We know, of course, on the basis
of much experience, that war itself tends to enrich a few and to make the poverty
of the many even greater. This war is not likely to be an exception but on the
contrary will probably be close to an ideal-typical conflict.
Rule by law and war simply do not go hand in hand. If it be contended
that law is disregarded in war but that war contributes to postwar rule by law,
the critic will demand proof. Here again the experience of history is against
the contention, and the Vietnamese conflict appears to be an excellent case study.
While we do not know much about the NLF, it is probable that the arbitrary
element in its actions is not a small one; and on the side of the South Viet-
namese government, there is little ground for belief that the war can possibly con-
tribute to the rule of law rather than to the governance of ambitious generals
and wealth-seeking politicians.
As for elimination of imperialist controls, the war is likely to enhance them.
As devastation escalates, dependence on outside -help will increase; and with
that assistance, under contemporary conditions, will come various forms of control.
Whether this control is Soviet, American, or Chinese makes little difference; for
from the viewpoint of the anti-imperialist, all represent elements foreign to Viet-
namese culture. Hence war will enhance injustice, not justice.
There is, therefore, little point in answering the question as to whether war is
the only possible means of securing justice. The burden of proof must always be
on those who advocate war. Assuming for the moment that there are indeed wars
which can help secure justice, we should point out that other methods in the
search for justice have not really been tried in Vietnam. Thus, international
16 See, e.g., Trace NHAT HANN, VIETNAM: LOTUS IN A SEA OF F E 70-71 (paper-
back ed., 1967).
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remedies have not been pursued in all their potentialities. Nor has the practice
of principled, organized nonviolent resistance - so effective in many other parts
of the world - been given more than sporadic attention.1 7 In the end, the
Vietnamese people cannot be "emancipated" by foreign powers but only by their
own planned nonviolent resistance to both domestic tyranny and foreign inter-
vention (whether by the United States, China, or the Soviet Union).
5. Right Means Only May Be Employed in the Conduct of the War. Immoral
Means Render the War Unjustifiable.- Even if the war were just on all other
scores, it would fail dismally to meet this requirement. Traditionally, this standard
has involved a central emphasis on waging war by methods which distinguish
between combatants and noncombatants, which utilize weapons proportionate
to .the ends sought, and which respect to the utmost degree the ordinary civil
order of the inhabitants.
Has the war in fact been conducted by such methods? The answer must be
an emphatic "no." While the Americans and the South Vietnamese government
appear to have been the greatest offenders - in part, because of their superiority
in bombing power and their general technological supremacy - the NLF and
North Vietnamese have not been guiltless. The so-called Vietcong - the military
arm of the National Liberation Front - have killed thousands of village head-
men and have not hesitated to use terroristic means in general. From the view-
point of "right means," the Vietcong have frequently been unjust.
But for sheer destruction of life, food, and countryside, Vietcong activities
have been mild by comparison with those of the Americans and their allies.
Although statistics in matters of this kind are notoriously difficult to obtain,
it seems probable that three civilians have been killed or wounded for every uni-
formed or armed soldier. Three seems to be a conservative figure although some
would put the number even higher. Official estimates of civilians killed are
almost certainly far too low, many of those listed as "military kills" undoubtedly
being civilians.18
It may be contended, of course, that Americans and South Vietnamese do
not deliberately intend to kill civilians, so that the moral onus is thereby de-
creased. The just-war theory makes a distinction between "accidental" killing of
civilians and "intentional" slaughter. However, due to the complex nature of the
Vietnamese war, civilians are inevitably killed. Bombers seek to destroy Vietcong
in South Vietnam and attack villages in which the Vietcong are allegedly hiding,
in the process slaughtering many women and children. To be sure, warnings
are supposed to be issued; but frequently they are not or they are misunderstood.
17See MULFORD Q. SIBLEY, THE QUIET BATTLE (1963), pts. II and III, for examples
of nonviolent resistance in many contexts. While some of the Buddhists have occasionally
turned in desperation to nonviolent resistance in Vietnam, there has been no systematic
sustained effort informed by a philosophy of nonviolence.
18 Government hospital statistics projected a civilian death and wounded toll in 1967
of at least 100,000. Of these, 24,000 were said to have been killed. New York Times,
Dec. 12, 1967, p. 11. But Senator Edward M. Kennedy estimated 1967 civilian casualties
at upwards of 150,000. Ibid., Dec. 14, 1967, p. 55. It is entirely possible- indeed, prob-
able - that both estimates are far too low, in light of what experienced war correspondents
report.
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Bombings in the North, while theoretically confined to military objectives (as
were the initial bombings in World War II) inevitably cease to be pinpoint-
hospitals are strnck, civilian homes are hit, and industry having only an indirect
connection with the war is destroyed. Like all recent wars, the Vietnamese
conflict has illustrated the fact that in modem times it is virtually impossible to
avoid the enormous and indiscriminate slaughter of civilians. Let us grant that
the intent of the war makers is not to destroy noncombatants. Nevertheless, in
opting for the war they are choosing, by virtue of the total context, to destroy
persons not bearing arms.
And what are we to say of the use of "antipersonnel" bombs - collections
of hundreds of small bombs which are released from airplanes and which do
little damage to buildings and supplies but enormous and indiscriminate damage
to human beings? That Americans are using these "fragmentation" bombs has
been admitted on at least one occasion by a military spokesman. 19 Can their
employment possibly be reconciled with just-war theories about methods?
One might restate the whole matter in this way: In choosing to make ice,
one is inevitably opting for cold water. To say that one wishes to make ice out
of water which remains warm is to choose the impossible. So, too, in modern-
war-and particularly in the Vietnamese war-he who piously announces
that, of course, he does not intend to kill women and children is not facing up
to the realities of the situation: if he wishes to carry on the war at all, he is
willing the slaughter of babies, women, and older men, as well as of those who
bear arms.2 0
On-the-spot reports seem to confirm all these observations. Martha Gellhorn,
a veteran war correspondent (see her October 1965 Manchester Guardian articles,
for example), would agree with them, as would Neil Sheehan, who was a re-
porter in Vietnam from 1962 to 1966. Says Sheehan:
An indication of what civilian casualties may be . .. is given by the fact
that American and other foreign medical teams working in three-quarters
of the country's 43 provinces treat 2,000 civilian war-wounded each month.
If one accepts the normal military ratio of one dead for two wounded, the
monthly figure is 1,000 civilian dead.
The number of wounded handled by the medical teams, I believe from
my own observation, is merely a fraction of the total. 2 1
Sheehan goes on to observe that while civilians are being killed and wounded by
both sides in large numbers, "my own investigations have indicated that the ma-
19 In an AP dispatch of April 10, 1967, Steve Stibbens reports that a "U.S. military
spokesman . . . confirmed a report from . . . six American Quakers who delivered medical
supplies to North Vietnam that U.S. planes are dropping antipersonnel fragmentation
bombs on North Vietnam." The Quakers said, too, that "There is a great deal of evidence
that regardless of the stated U.S. policy of bombing military targets only, civilian targets
- hospitals, schools and homes - are being destroyed." Men, women, and children were
being killed by bombs "specially designed for that purpose." St. Paul Dispatch, Apr. 19,
1967, p. 20.
20 Howard Zinn rightly comments that "In Vietnam, . . . the bombing and shelling of
civilians constitutes the war." VIETNAM: THE LoGic OF WITHDRAWAL 61 (1967).
21 Neil Sheehan, Not a Dove, But No Longer a Hawk, New York Times Magazine, Oct.
9. 1966, p. 135.
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jority of civilian casualties result from American and South Vietnamese airstrikes
and artillery and naval gunfire." And he cites one fishing village in Quangngai
province in which at least 180 persons - and possibly 600 - had been killed
in the preceding two months by bombing and by destroyers of the Seventh Fleet.
The hamlets which composed the village (formerly a community of 15,000 souls)
had become simply "rubble."
Those who argue that a just-war theory will sanction the methods of the
Vietnamese war must ignore reports - and this is only a random selection -
like the following:
"I got me a VC, man. I got at least two of them bastards." The exultant
cry followed a 10-second burst of automatic-weapons fire yesterday, and the
dull crump of a grenade exploding underground. The Marines ordered a
Vietnamese corporal to go down into the grenade-blasted hole to pull out
their victims. The victims were three children between 11 and 14 - two
boys and a girl. Their bodies were riddled with bullets . .. "Oh, my God,"
a young Marine exclaimed. "They're all kids."22
The napalm was expected to force the people - fearing the heat and
the burning - out into the open. Then the second plane was to move in
with heavy fragmentation bombs to hit whatever - or whomever - had
rushed out into the open. ... We came down very low, flying very fast, and
I could see some of the villagers trying to head away from the burning shore
in their sampans. The village was burning fiercely .... There were probably
between 1000 and 1500 people living in the fishing village we attacked. It
is difficult to estimate how many were killed. It is equally difficult to judge
if there actually were any Viet Cong in the village, and if so, if any were
killed.2 3
By the time the Super Sabres made their last pass, sixteen Truong Thanh
residents, including six children, were dead and 124 lay wounded .... Asked
if it were true that under present United States military ground rules in Viet-
nam, incidents such as occurred in Truong Thanh were apt to happen again,
the U.S. provincial adviser replied: "Honestly, there is that probability." 24
Dear Mom and Dad: Today we went on a mission and I'm not very
proud of myself, my friends or my country. We burned every hut in sight!
It was a small rural network of villages and the people were incredibly
poor. My unit burned and plundered their meager possessions. Let me try
to explain the situation to you.
The huts here are thatched palm leaves. Each one has a dried mud
bunker inside. These bunkers are to protect the families. Kind of like air
raid shelters.
My unit commanders, however, chose to think that these bunkers are
offensive. So every 'hut we find that has a bunker, we are ordered to burn
to the ground!
When the 10 helicopters landed this morning, in the midst of the huts,
and six men jumped out of each "chopper," we were firing the moment we
hit the ground. We fired into all the huts we could. Then we got "on the
line" and swept the area.
22 UPI dispatch from Chan Son, August 3, 1965.
23 Bernard Fall, in RAMPARTS, December, 1965.
24 NEWSWEEK, August 22, 1966, p. 64.
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It is then that we burn these huts and take all men old enough to carry
a weapon and the "choppers" come and get them (they take them to a
collection point a few miles away for interrogation). The families don't
understand this. The Viet Cong fill their minds with tales saying the GIs
kill all their men.
So, everyone is crying, begging and praying that we don't separate them
and take their husbands and fathers, sons and grandfathers. The women wail
and moan.
Then they watch in terror as we burn their homes, personal possessions and
food. Yes, we burn all rice and shoot all livestock.
Some of the guys are so careless! Today a buddy of mine called "La Dai"
("Come here") into a hut and an old man came out of the bomb shelter. My
buddy told the old man to get away from the hut and since we have to move
quickly on a sweep, just threw a hand grenade into the shelter.
As he pulled the pin the old man got excited and started jabbering and
running toward my buddy and the hut. A GI, not understanding, stopped
the old man with a football tackle just as my buddy threw the grenade into
the shelter. (There is a four-second delay on a hand grenade.)
After he threw it, and was running for cover (during this four-second
delay), we all heard a baby crying from inside the shelter!
There was nothing we could do....
Aftex the explosion we found the mother, two children (ages about 6 and
12, boy and girl) and an almost newborn baby. That is what the old man
was trying to tell us!
The shelter was small and narrow. They were all huddled together. The
three of us dragged out the bodies onto the floor of the hut....
The children's fragile bodies were torn apart, literally mutilated. We
looked at each other and burned the hut.2 5
In addition to the unnumbered thousands of civilians killed and wounded, it
is estimated that as a result of Vietcong attacks, American bombing, and
"pacification" efforts, there are some 2,000,000 or more refugees. Most of these,
observers seem to agree, are the result of American and South Vietnamese actions,
not of Vietcong destruction. Two million homeless out of a population of
roughly 16,000,000 souls would be the equivalent of 25,000,000 American home-
less in a population of 200,000,000. Some estimates place the number of Viet-
namese refugees even higher - at 3,000,000 or 4,000,000.
But we are not so much concerned with exact statistics as we are with the
moral implications of a war that is conducted by means which inevitably throw
millions of women and children into ramshackle and disease-ridden refugee
camps; which burn their villages in order to "protect" them; which destroy
their crops; which kill their precious water buffaloes (so indispensable for a liveli-
hood) ; and which produce a sense of utter hopelessness.
It may be said truly that the war is being conducted by methods which have
the effect of literally devastating the countryside and killing or wounding hun-
dreds of thousands of civilians. That all this takes place in the name of protec-
tion against aggression and establishing the conditions for self-determination
makes one wonder whether Orwell's 1984 is not being enacted in 1967. Such
25 This letter was originally printed in the Akron, Ohio, Beacon journal, March 27,
1967. Its authenticity is vouched for by the Beacon Journal. See also anonymous letters
cited by Senator Fulbright in the CONGRESSIONAL REcoRw, June 16, 1967, pp. S 8350-52.
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an impression is reinforced when one hears defenders of the war say that opposi-
tion to the conflict postpones the coming of peace!
The moralist may well ask himself whether such methods can be distinguished
from those avowedly war measures utilized by Adolf Hitler- killing of the
mentally deranged and the destruction of millions of human beings in death
camps. How one can justify the methods used in Vietnam while condemning
those employed by Hitler is beyond this writer's comprehension.
6. There Must Be a Reasonable Hope of Victory. - Comment on this cri-
terion must turn in part on what we mean by the vexing term "victory." It may
imply military triumph over the so-called enemy, so that he submits to terms
imposed by the conqueror. It may mean, alternatively, success in the long run
for the political objectives of the parties involved. While the two meanings may
be related, this is not necessarily so: an immediate military triumph may be
purchased at the cost of long-run political success.
In most wars, the hope for immediate military victory is high; but in all too
many wars, the expectation is not fulfilled. Notoriously, the role of unintended
consequences is even greater in war than in the civil affairs of life. The great
god Fortune is first cousin to Mars. In the Vietnamese war, military victory
can probably be attained by the United States, but only at an enormous cost.
Some have suggested- quite plausibly - that ten years of continuous destruc-
tion might be involved, so that in the end the victor will dictate terms in a largely
depopulated nation whose people he had come to "protect." Such a victory
would be one only in name.
As for military victory for Hanoi and the National Liberation Front, it would
seem to be equally remote. The technical capacity of the opposing side - barring
massive intervention of the Soviet Union or other industrialized nations -is too
'great to be overcome. While one can admire the sheer courage of the many
Davids fighting Goliath, one can hardly hold out hope of triumph. There is no
reasonable hope of military victory.
What, then, of victory in the second sense - long-run political success some-
how advanced through war? Here the prospect would appear to be even more
dim. It is sometimes said that victory for the United States would consist in
bringing the opposing side to the conference table. But even supposing that air
strikes will produce this result, how can "negotiation" under these circumstances
help resolve the political questions involved? If the United States continues to
occupy the country militarily, the peace at best can be only one of impasse; for
the occupying army would no doubt be regarded as the enemy of every Viet-
namese, North or South - an enemy to be harassed by all possible means. Only
through withdrawal of all American forces could conditions for long-run political
settlement be promoted, given prevalent attitudes in Vietnam. But withdrawal
could take place without further prolongation of the war, given a better insight
into the political realities. A continuation of the war is not necessary to make
withdrawal possible; a basic change of attitude is sufficient.
As for the possibility of political success through war on the part of Hanoi
and the NLF, it is difficult to see how a ten-year struggle without hope of mili-
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tary victory can help. Only corpses would be "liberated" by the war of libera-
tion. No more than in the case of the United States can there be a "reasonable
hope of victory" in the political sense. It is as illusory to expect fundamental
social change through war as it is to hope for "revolution" through violence.
Wars of liberation do not liberate - instead, they produce new hierarchies of
power and new forms of slavery, besides mountains of corpses. The only hope
for victory is by abandoning war: radical change must begin with the means,
for the means cannot sharply contradict the end sought.2 6 The means of
imperialism and exploitation are war and violence; if would-be "liberators"
employ "imperialist" means they will emerge with new guises of "imperialist"
ends.
Thus far, our comments on the possibility of victory have assumed no massive
military intervention by either the Soviet Union or China. But such intervention
is by no means unlikely, particularly if the Americans invade the North with
-ground troops. Once China and the Soviet Union intervene with troops, the
probability of even military victory, let alone political triumph, becomes more
dim; and the possibility of a world war in which all parties would in effect be
defeated becomes greater. We cannot assume that the breach between China
and the Soviet Union would not be repaired under such circumstances, so that
the vast manpower of China and the enormous nuclear power of the Soviet
Union would be united against the United States. Surely he would be a rash
person who would assert that victory under such circumstances could be a
reasonable hope.
In sum, the war cannot lead to victory, whether military or political, except
at such cost and under such circumstances as to make the victory little short
of disaster.
7. The Good To Be Attained by Victory Must Outweigh the Probable Evil
Effects of the War.- In view of what has been said in the previous sections,
this paper could hardly argue that the good to be attained by the Vietnamese
war would outweigh its evil effects. Its evil is both immediate and remote.
In the immediate sense, the war involves in its train vast destruction of human
life; wiping out of means of subsistence; dislocation of millions of people; gearing
of economies for the ends of war, thus making more difficult a transformation
into economies of peace; inflation, possibly of monumental proportions, which
always bears with unusual ferocity on the poor; pyramiding of fortunes by war
profiteers; a vast expansion of prostitution; and what can only be described as
savagery at every level -killing prisoners, robbing the dead, 27 and callousness
to human suffering.
The remote evils set in motion by the war will be stimulation of hatred;
social disorganization for many, many years (no matter who "wins") ; the persist-
ence of military tyranny (again, regardless of "winners"); the ubiquity of an
26 A lesson one would have thought we should have learned through the reading of
John Dewey and works like Aldous Huxley's ENDS AND MEANS (1937).
27 Several television programs have portrayed American soldiers cutting off the ears
of dead Vietcong - for "souvenir" purposes.
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atmosphere of suspicion; still greater racism (white "imperialists" versus Asian
"liberators") ; thousands of orphans to be placed and cared for; the desperate
need for enormous economic assistance just to reconstruct what has been de-
stroyed; still greater undermining of republican and democratic values in the
American empire - the presidency, for example, becoming, even more than today,
a monarchical institution; enhanced "arrogance of power," if the United States
is nominally victorious, and, if it is "defeated," a reactionary politics bent on
revenge; and an obscuring of the good in the American reputation by the evil
revealed in the war.
It is difficult to imagine a situation in which the good attained by military
victory could possibly outweigh evils of these kinds. At best, the war might
produce some sort of coalition government; but this would undoubtedly change
within a few years into something which could hardly be anticipated. At worst,
American or other foreign military power would dominate Vietnam for a long
period. And the country in either case would lie ruined to an even greater extent
than today.
Meanwhile, neither the short-run nor the long-run effects of the war would
have contributed one iota to the solution of problems which will shape conflicts
and challenge politics in the future - problems like hunger, poverty, disease,
industrialization and its control, population expansion, and world order. On the
whole, the war will have made more difficult any serious grappling with these
issues, whoever is "victorious."
8. An Unjust War and Its Implications. -None of the seven criteria for
a just war have been completely fulfilled by the war in Vietnam. Even if most
of them were met, the wholesale violation of the fifth condition - that of means
or methods -would condemn the conflict, as waged both by the United States
and by Hanoi and the National Liberation Front.
Of all the American politicians who have criticized the war, only a handful
have touched on the moral issues. One of them is Senator Eugene J. McCarthy.
We might epitomize our conclusion by citing his evaluation, offered in the early
part of 1967:
The resolution of the question of the justice or the injustice of a war
depends upon three general considerations:
One, the substantial one of the purposes and the objectives;
Two, that of methods and of means used;
And three, that of proportion in which, accepting that the purpose is
good and that the methods are acceptable, one must still raise the practical
question of whether or not the evil and the destruction required to win the
war are proportionate to the good which may be achieved.
Our involvement in Vietnam must be examined in the light of these three
considerations ....
We are not sure as to just what we are seeking ....
We must question our methods as well ....
The final measurement ... is that of proportion.
There are three points which must be raised:
One, assuming that we understand what we mean by victory, is there a
possibility of victory?
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Two, what would be the cost of that victory?
Three, what assurance do we have that a better world or a better society
will emerge in Vietnam following that victory?
The answers should be positive on each of these three counts.
I do not believe that the answers are positive and since they are not, we
must be prepared to pass a hard and harsh moral judgment on our actions
in Vietnam.28
In view of this "harsh moral judgment," what is the obligation of the indi-
vidual in relation to the war? At a minimum, it would seem, he ought to devote
great energy to stopping the war. He must advocate immediate American
withdrawal -for if the war is immoral, how can he countenance his country's
engaging in unjust acts? If he is subject to the draft, he must either become a
conscientious objector or, if denied the status of objector, refuse to join the
army, even at the risk of prison. At times, he may conclude that the most pru-
dent as well as moral conduct will entail forms of civil disobedience.
In passing "harsh moral judgment" on the Vietnamese war, an even broader
question is implicitly raised: Is any modem war likely to satisfy the seven stan-
dards for a just war? Another way of putting the question is to ask to what
extent probable future wars, from the viewpoint of morality, will resemble the
Vietnamese conflict. Here the answer would seem to be relatively certain: under
probable circumstances, all wars are likely to be similar to the Vietnamese war.
What, then, should be the individual's attitude to these future conflicts? The
answer, which by now should be obvious, will be revolutionary in its implications.
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28 "Redirecting American Power," speech before The Nation Institute in Los Angeles,
Feb. 25, 1967 (mimeographed).
